JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2018 • FOGHORN 27 REGULATORYREPORT I suppose the Coast Guard, under current circumstances, is able to balance resource demand across all maritime transportation segments. At least there is not yet a movement by Congress to look at relief actions. The passenger vessel, small passenger vessel, and barge segments currently have no alternative to regu- latory compliance under Coast Guard regulations. There are programs that may provide minor resource savings depending on Coast Guard accep- tance of vessels under the Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) or voluntary Safety Management Systems (SMS). In the past year, the Coast Guard has tried to put in place a program of tiered in- spection level based on small passenger vessel/owner record of safety and reg- ulatory compliance but commands in the field have been reluctant to adopt the policy. The new towing vessel inspection under Subchapter M provides for direct Coast Guard inspection or compliance through third party audited SMS. The Coast Guard has not identified enough resources to unilaterally inspect all towing vessels and probably could not given the premise of Subchapter M that most towing vessel operators will opt for the third party route. Since imple- mentation of Subchapter M is spread out over a four year period the Coast Guard does not now and probably cannot assess the full impact of towing vessel inspection. The third sector is one where the Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) into the loss of El Faro has exposed a Coast Guard conundrum. Under the law class societies can perform certain Coast Guard regulatory inspection functions under delegation of respon- sibility while the regulatory authority remains with the Coast Guard. Earlier MBIs cited needs to address particular- ly the delegation of Load Line inspec- tion. The delegator loses experience and acumen and the delegated has other primary responsibilities. The delegated function becomes atrophied to the dis- service of the vessel and owner and the oversight of the regulator. It is here that the Coast Guard is between a rock and a hard place. Delegation has exposed the regulator to failure and the inability to reclaim the responsibility due to lack of resources and expertise. The history of Coast Guard concern for the delegation of load line respon- sibility begins with the MBI for the SS Poet lost without a trace in October 1980. The Board had neither physical evidence nor survivors to assist in the investigation. The process relied on documents and certificates and allied person testimony. Testimony was from inspectors, surveyors, maintenance and service vendors and the like. While the Board did reason a date/time estimate of loss and a series of possible casualty sequences the vessel and its personnel loss remains a mystery. The Board, however, made one recommen- dation in the area of concern in this article: “Recommendation 7: That the