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APRIL 2016 FOGHORN 15 REGULATORYREPORT By Peter Lauridsen PVA Regulatory Affairs Consultant I recently had the opportunity to sit in on the opening days of testimony before the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation MBI convened to investigate the loss of the SS El Faro. I looked forward to being an observer to another event in the history of the Coast Guards marine casualty inves- tigation mission. While listening to the witnesses as the Board begins to assemble the facts that will become its report to the Commandant was sometimes difficult for me. The expe- rience was both a professional and a personal review. As a consultant since retirement from the Coast Guard I have followed investigations involving passenger vessels and others that had a potential impact on our marine industry as a whole. During my Coast Guard career my duties often involved marine investigation analysis inves- tigative report review and leading investigations including serving on three Commandant Marine Boards of Investigation MBI. The evolution of the Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety Board NTSB relationship is--and was--in some ways dramatic between my firsthand experience as Coast Guard officer and what I witnessed today with the El Faro investigation. The Coast Guard and its predecessor organizations has relied heavily on the investigation of marine casualties to develop remedial regulations and proactively seek improvements in the name of safety of property and life. Its stated goal in investigation is the deter- mination of cause for the purposes of review of existing regulation recom- mending new regulation enforcement of laws and regulation identifying any contributory conduct of maritime The Coast Guard and National Transportation Board History A Personal Report